THE UNITED NATIONS AND CANADA
WHAT CANADA COULD AND SHOULD DO AT THE UNITED NATIONS 2018: A QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP

edited by John E. Trent
Preface

An Open Letter to
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and
Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland
Concerning the Government of Canada’s
Foreign Policy

Dear Mr. Prime Minister and Minister Freeland,

Your Liberal Party electoral program and your government’s early foreign policy pronouncements announced Canada’s ‘Recommitment to the United Nations and the international community’ and to reinforcing multilateralism by re-establishing Canada’s ‘leadership in world politics’. We fully understand that you have been justifiably preoccupied with our relationship with the United States. But the world is in economic, social and political turmoil that is putting pressure on international organizations. It requires countries like Canada to mobilize coalitions of actors and civil society to renew the international system. The objective of this booklet is to encourage your Government to return to your two goals of reengagement and leadership on the world stage before it is too late.

With regard to reengagement with the United Nations, the Liberals said Canada would enhance its participation in peacekeeping, welcome refugees and immigrants, combat global warming, increase aid to the poorest in developing countries, protect women and children in conflict, furnish humanitarian aid following natural catastrophes, change the approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, promote human rights and rebuild bridges with the international community. There is also the question of UN renewal to achieve these ends. Your speeches on diversity, optimism, openness and tolerance were applauded around the world. But clearly we must move beyond words to greater action.
An Open Letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland
Concerning the Government of Canada’s Foreign Policy

Your Government has also announced its intention to seek a seat on the UN Security Council for the period 2021-2022. This campaign is entering a crucial year at the UN. Canada started late and faces very strong competition from Ireland and Norway, who both make strong, consistent contributions to the work of the Organization. Not only will UN member states want to know what Canada will do for them but more importantly what leadership role Canada will undertake for the UN as an institution. Time is short. Our campaign will require a strategy and a team of specialists to show why Canada is worthy of being elected. We have to show how our foreign policy goals are attached to significant global norms that are crucial for the world's future.

Mr. Trudeau and Minister Freeland, in these times, when others lack a strong commitment to multilateralism, we would like to encourage your Government to return to the foreign policy objectives you enunciated during the election campaign and the government's first months in office.

Sincerely,

John Trent
Chair, Board of Directors, World Federalist Movement - Canada
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Refugees: A Test of Political Will and Resilience

Lloyd Axworthy

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of forcibly displaced persons – over 68.5 million as of June 2018 – is higher now than at any time since the end of the Second World War. Of this total, 40 million are internally displaced persons, the number seeking safety across international borders as refugees topped 24.5 million and 3.1 million are classified as asylum seekers.

The causes are numerous. Most move to escape armed conflict: poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate change), or other environmental or economic factors. Many move for a combination of these reasons.

The present national or international structures are not designed nor equipped to meet the multiple surges of people seeking protection from risks to their security and wellbeing.

The geographic distribution of refugees places unequal burdens on a few UN member states. 90 percent of the world’s refugees are hosted by 10 neighbouring states, most of which have scarcely the resources to look after their own people, let alone the needs of destitute refugees.

With global refugee numbers increasing around the world, political tensions are also on the rise. And political accountability for the treatment of refugees is in decline. More and more unscrupulous governments are resorting to refoulement to manage their borders – the appalling practice of forcing refugees to return home to countries where they face persecution and physical harm.

The way the world comes to grips with the rising number of refugees needs a major re-set. The institutions, practices and conventions on refugees and migration are still rooted in the post-World War II era and are inadequate to meet the demands of today. Instruments such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and in a peacekeeping context the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, are weak and/or out of date.

This year the UN is completing a process leading to two “global compacts,” a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, through the UN General Assembly in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration. These instruments help update and pull together the strands of various international instruments and norms. While they break little new ground, they provide a useful platform for pursuing greater international cooperation.

As Canada’s Foreign Minister, I was involved in efforts like the Landmines Treaty and the International Criminal Court negotiations, which made me realize that there are limitations within UN structures to the degree of freedom to think and act outside the box. A lot of interests are at stake. Ultimately the UN needs to be the place where change happens, but it’s not the place where the best thinking is going to be done on the kinds of normative and institutional changes that are necessary.

The World Refugee Council (WRC) that I Chair -- supported by Centre for International Governance
Innovation (CIGI), the government of Canada, several North American and European foundations – is working on recommendations for significant reforms, as well as mobilizing the political will needed to implement them.

We have undertaken a series of on the ground consultations in areas where there were existing and emerging surges of refugees, provided a venue where refugee voices could be heard and have initiated a series of workshops and research papers to dig deeper into the opportunities for innovative governance, economic and technology solutions.

Importantly, we undertook to square the need for cooperative reform initiatives with the need to recognize the importance of national and regional boundary security issues. Improvements are needed throughout the system.

**Funding.** Ideas and options for moving beyond a system built on voluntary contributions include introducing assessed contributions, or levies on international transactions, to fostering refugee enterprise and confiscating perpetrators’ assets.

**Accountability.** We can strengthen mechanisms for holding accountable the individuals and governments whose actions cause the suffering and displacement. But at the same time, those governments and organizations with responsibility for addressing the problems but instead ignore treaty obligations, or don’t honour pledges, should be named and shamed.

**Governance** reform and restructuring. Protection and assistance for refugees needs to be recognized as a common public good and collective responsibility. A more equitable global burden sharing will be needed.

At its core, the world is not suffering from a refugee crisis, but from a leadership crisis — a deficit of vision and imagination and, most fundamentally, of humanity and solidarity.

Our report, expected in 2019, will build on the UN’s Global Compacts. We want to move beyond declaratory statements and exhortations to governments and agencies, to include a basis for action and implementation.

Canada can and should contribute to a core cross-regional group of states and other stakeholders who will make the long-term commitment to resolving the plight of refugees. There needs to be an Action Network for refugee reform.

Lloyd Axworthy is currently Chairperson of the World Refugee Council. He has held several Cabinet positions in the government of Canada, including Minister of Employment and Immigration and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also a member of the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance, and international Co-President of the World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy.
Development assistance: is 0.7% possible?

Aniket Bhushan and Yiagadeesen Samy

0.7 in historical and current policy context

The 0.7% target, whereby Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD (OECD DAC), including Canada, would spend 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) on official development assistance (ODA), has been a long-standing target since it was first proposed by the Pearson Commission in 1969. Though repeatedly re-endorsed over time, and despite being accepted as a long-term target by many DAC members, few of them meet it today. In 2017, only 5 (the United Kingdom (henceforth UK), Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg and Sweden) of 29 OECD DAC members met the 0.7% target. A few other donors such as France and Korea have recently committed to scale up their aid spending. The unweighted average ODA/GNI across all DAC members is 0.31% while the average country effort is around 0.41%.

The case of the UK is interesting because it made a long-term commitment to development spending and achieved the target in 2013 despite domestic fiscal pressures and a global economic crisis. Following a pledge made at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005, UK aid spending almost doubled from 2005 to 2016. Cross-party support made both the achievement of this goal and support for higher aid spending possible. The target became law in the 2015 International Development Act with cross-party support under a coalition government. This example shows that it is indeed possible to meet targets and support global development if there is a political will to do so.

By contrast, Canada’s ODA/GNI ratio currently stands at only 0.26% and about 2% of the country’s budget. The ODA/GNI ratio has been on a declining trend since 2010 when it was 0.34%. Under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, aid was cut to balance the budget and the Liberals under Justin Trudeau have not done much to reverse the trend since being elected in 2015. Canada’s best recorded performance was 0.54% way back in 1975. Its poor ranking among OECD DAC donors is a fact that has been lamented by many aid activists and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over the years. At present, there is no political will to even establish a timetable that would clearly identify how to achieve the 0.7 ODA/GNI target.

Three scenarios for Canada

Is it possible for Canada to meet the 0.7% target? Given Canada’s current ODA/GNI ratio, it is relatively easy to make a case that aid spending can and should be increased. Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and the need for traditional development assistance in the so-called Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) are two examples of where more ODA could go a long way towards supporting the poorest in the most difficult environments.

There are a few options that could be considered to either meet, or bridge the gap with, the 0.7% target.

First, Canadian civil society groups have called for a 10-year timetable to reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7%. This is an ambitious goal that would necessitate a compounded annual growth rate of more than 15%. A second option would be to follow what the UK did. Canada is roughly where the UK was in the late 1990s and if it were to follow the UK trajectory, it would require a little bit longer than the first option, and hence a slightly smaller compounded annual growth rate. A third option would be less ambitious and simply double Canada’s international assistance envelope (IAE), which is something that was pledged by Canada in...
2002 (under a Liberal government) and achieved in 2010 (under a Conservative government). And therefore, there is precedent to achieve such a doubling with cross-party support (this would require a compound annual growth rate of about 8% for the IAE). In this case, i.e. with a compounded annual growth rate under 10%, Canada would not achieve the 0.7% until around the mid-2040s. It goes without saying that the fiscal cost of the first option would be higher than the second one, which in turn would be higher than the third.1

Given the current fiscal environment, which saw modest increases in Canada’s international assistance in this year’s federal budget, and an absence of political will (which was present in the case of the UK), the most realistic option seems to be the third one.

**Even if possible, is 0.7 relevant?**

However, perhaps a more pertinent question to ask is whether the 0.7% target is still relevant today? The financing gap model on which the 0.7% target is based no longer makes sense today because of much higher levels of private capital that now reach the developing world. As a result, the financing gaps may not be as significant for certain countries to attain a targeted growth rate given the characteristics of their economies. It also never made any sense to allocate aid spending based on the levels of income in donor countries when the focus should be on the development needs of recipient countries.

It is also clear from recent trends in development finance globally, including in Canada, that there is now an increasing appetite for leveraging private capital through official financing, instead of relying on traditional development assistance that will be insufficient to meet the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Consider for example that the latest Canadian budget proposed an International Assistance Innovation Program and a Sovereign Loans Program for a total of about $1.5 billion to leverage private finance by reallocating resources from the existing (unallocated) IAE base. Canada’s new development finance institution, FinDev Canada, is also now operational, with a base of $300 million over 5 years. Funds which though aimed squarely at developmental purposes, may not however count as “ODA” (or fully as ODA) and therefore do not help reach the 0.7 level.

In this context, it is questionable that even if possible i.e. with the requisite fiscal room and political will, whether the 0.7 target is seen as relevant at least in the context of Canada’s official contribution to global development. After all, contrary to the recommendations of various parliamentary standing committees (which reviewed the topic both in 2005 and 2016) Canada’s FIAP which became operational in 2017 and is the first update to Canada’s foreign aid policy framework in over a decade, makes no mention of 0.7 or any other ODA spending target.

For details please see: Bhushan A. and Reilly-King F. 2016. Getting to 0.7: Three Scenarios for Canada. Available at: https://cidpnsi.ca/getting-to-0-7-three-scenarios-for-canada/. This analysis is slightly dated and was conducted based on past known IAE figures, which have been updated in Budget 2018, which, it should be noted, added $600 million to the IAE. Nevertheless, the general forecast and assumptions hold. And even with this increase, which though the ‘largest in about a decade’ according to the Minister of Finance, we have calculated that IAE and ODA as a share of Canadian fiscal expenditure (i.e. federal program spending) could well decline, not rise (for details see: https://www.opencanada.org/features/did-budget-2018-deliver-funds-canada-needs-lead-nice-try-no/).
Andrew Cohen

Last December Canada marked the 60th anniversary of Lester Pearson’s Nobel Prize for Peace, awarded in 1957 for his creative resolution of the Suez Crisis at the United Nations. This was the capstone of Pearson’s long and brilliant diplomatic career which had made him the best-known Canadian of the post-war world, marking the acme of Canada’s internationalism.

Canada would remain engaged in the world for the next generation or so. It continued “to punch above its weight” – a peculiarly Canadian conceit -- until the early 1990s. Up until then, as a peacekeeper, we accepted all invitations to join UN missions; as a warrior, we fought in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo; as a humanitarian, we had respectable goals in international assistance.

But the reality was that we were withdrawing from the world. Blame thirty years of Constitutional Wars and the challenges of recession. When Jean Chretien became prime minister in 1993 and faced a debt crisis, Canada entered a calamitous decade of shrinking budgets and dwindling resources. We withdrew from peacekeeping. We underfunded the military. We abandoned long-standing targets of international assistance. Our diplomacy -- with some successes in creating the anti-landmines regime and the International Criminal Court under Lloyd Axworthy – was less engaged.

During ten years of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives, liberal internationalism became passé. Harper loathed the Liberals and placed Pearson under historical house arrest, his name and legacy unspoken. Harper disdained the United Nations and, in 2010, lost Canada’s traditional rotational seat on the Security Council it had held every decade since the 1940s.

When Justin Trudeau’s Liberals took power in 2015, they declared “Canada is back”. But as Canada looks at the world today it begs the question: just what does being “back” mean?

In three years as prime minister, Trudeau has cultivated an image as an international celebrity, propelled by youth, looks and name, as well as a penchant for socks, selfies and slogans. He talks about “a feminist foreign policy,” casting Canada as progressive voice amid a growing authoritarianism. Unlike Donald Trump, it is true, Trudeau honours international institutions, joins international efforts to combat climate change, welcomes Syrian refugees, embraces free trade, collective security and the other pillars of the post-war international system.

His government has rejoined peacekeeping, modestly, sending soldiers to Africa. It has supported international efforts in the fight against terrorism, training troops in Iraq and deploying soldiers in support of NATO in Latvia. At the United Nations, Canada is campaigning for a seat on the Security Council in 2020.

Returning to the Security Council is cheered in Canada, which loves its reputation as moderate, tolerant, generous, and diverse. It is content with what it is – a pluralistic society, where citizenship is remarkable easy to obtain and hard to lose, with no clear national identity beyond its
multiculturalism, a point Trudeau celebrates. Canada is happier with what it is in the world than what it does in the world. This kind of self-congratulation means we don’t have to try very hard, and we don’t.

Canada’s highest priority is the United States, the foundation of our prosperity and our security. Renegotiating NAFTA and managing a mercurial president has been the preoccupation of the government. It has required diplomacy and restraint, and consumed the cabinet and bureaucracy. Given the challenge, the government has done reasonably well.

Beyond that, though, it is hard to discern a notable foreign policy. The government has made a commitment to a bigger military, which may or may not happen over ten years. In international assistance, Canada is not back but “way back”, as analyst Robert Greenhill laments. In fact, our commitment is down to 0.26 percent of Gross National Income, what one analyst calls “the worst government in a generation.” It is the old story: Canada wants things but doesn’t want to pay for them.

So, Canada talks. Its foreign policy, beyond the United States, is largely a feint; we tell more than show. The feminist foreign policy is well-meaning as far as it goes. But like so much else with Trudeau’s government, it seems largely gestural. If Canada wants to be serious in the world it has to spend money. If it truly believes in peacekeeping, which we all know is not what it was, we have to have the resources. Let us recommit to training, supplying and leading peacekeepers in the field, making this our mission in the world it once was.

In foreign assistance, let us recommit ourselves to reaching 0.7 percent, as five other OECD nations have done. (It would be more realistic to commit ourselves to 0.5 percent, which we reached decades ago but could not sustain). If we want to focus on programs for women, fine, but for goodness sake, fund them.

Canada can think creatively, finding roles for itself in the world. It can propose serious reform of the Security Council so it looks more like 2018 than 1945. It can declare itself unequivocally for human rights and democracy – not just when it is convenient, and it could lead efforts to support Taiwan in the face of a menacing China.

For Canada, it is about desire. We had it once and can find again – if we believe in ourselves.
Robin Collins

The centrality of the United Nations for conflict resolution and sustainable development are obvious touchstones for global governance advocates. The idea of “sustainable common security” is one way we might widen the tent, to bring more governments and other stakeholders into the fold.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (adopted in 2015) embraced a kind of synchronicity when it focused on how to create “peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development,” it declared, “without peace and no peace without sustainable development.” The same year, the Security Council and General Assembly adopted “sustaining peace” as a new framework guiding peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.

Not everyone, and certainly not every powerful state, sees the UN the same way, but the organization remains our preeminent source of international law, through its Charter and resolutions, for peace and security, human rights and sustainable development.

As far back as the 1970s, when alternatives to threatening Cold War security postures and nuclear deterrence were pursued, the common security rubric — ideas of mutual vulnerability, centrality of the peace process, de-escalation, disarmament, arms control, the minimum use of force — appeared from the margins and gained prominence in peace research circles and some governments.

In Canada, there’s been an update making the rounds over the last few years, with growing recognition of Sustainable Common Security (SCS). It is a hybrid of several complementary ideas, offering a durable, shared-security alternative to mainstream national and competitive security that is based on threats, overwhelming power and eternal arms races.

Peter Langille, who has fleshed out an outline of the SCS framework, sees it as an umbrella concept synonymous with positive peace, “more holistic than the narrower notions of national and international security or the conception of negative peace (the absence of direct, overt violence).” It is considerate of interdependence across systems, beliefs and borders, and “makes the connection between direct violence, structural violence (exploitation and exclusion) and cultural violence…”

Some core elements include: (1) elevating protection of the most vulnerable, particularly succeeding generations, as a shared security imperative; and (2) prioritizing prevention of armed conflict. But just as importantly, addressing fundamental root causes of security challenges – whether from climate change, nuclear weapons, systemic violent conflict or weak and undemocratic global governance – cannot be ignored nor delayed without incurring higher common costs and risks.

In Canada several civil society networks have adopted these ideas.

For example, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons considered “sustainable common security” as an umbrella concept at its annual deliberations in November 2015.
In 2016 a 13-page statement, “A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security,” was produced as a contribution to the Canadian Defence Policy review process and was supported by a number of mainstream and influential peace organizations. It stated:

Canada can be a beacon of hope in an unsettled world by pursuing and promoting, wherever possible, conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes and sustainable peace-building. We can press for multilateral over unilateral responses. We can be a constructive, innovative problem solver, striving to bring conflicting parties closer together to resolve their differences. We can thereby stave off or hasten the repair of breaches of the peace, limit human suffering and environment degradation and minimize costly military interventions.

The NGO statement was supported in a 2017 resolution by the prestigious Canadian Pugwash Group. And subsequently the Group of 78 forum in 2017, “Getting to Nuclear Zero”, framed 25 proposals that were agreed by consensus, including that “Social movements and states shall prioritize Sustainable Common Security to address shared global challenges.”

In June of 2018, a forum held in Toronto, “How to Save the World in a Hurry”, organized by veteran Peace Magazine editor Metta Spencer, framed 25 proposals that were agreed by consensus, including that “Social movements and states shall prioritize Sustainable Common Security to address shared global challenges.”

There is also evidence of a fresh perspective surfacing at the UN, particularly in the new “sustaining peace” framework that is the conceptual basis for a comprehensive cross-departmental set of “peace and security architecture” reforms that Secretary-General Guterres is implementing at the UN Secretariat.

In a time when nationalism and exceptionalism are all too often at odds with the international legal order, governments like Canada should embrace the shift to a Sustainable Common Security policy framework.

Robin Collins is a Board Member with WFM – Canada, Vice-Chair of Canadian Pugwash Group, and Chair of the disarmament and arms control working group of The Group of 78. His NGO work focuses on peace and disarmament issues.
Canada needs Africa to gain seat on Security Council

Jocelyn Coulon

During the 2015 election campaign the government of Justin Trudeau made the return of Canada on the international stage the slogan for its future foreign policy. One of the key elements of this “coming back” was the commitment to gain a non-permanent seat for Canada on the UN Security Council for the 2021- 2022 mandate. At the present stage, this election is far from being won. While Canada did sit on the Security Council every 10 years between 1946 and 2000, it suffered a humiliating defeat in 2010 under the Conservative government. The causes of this debacle are numerous but one appeared particularly critical for analysts in the know: the Africans were not in our corner at the time of voting. Africa represents the largest political block of countries at the UN General Assembly with 54 of the 193 member States of the organization.

Such a block cannot be ignored by any state, all the more so that Africans agree most of the time to adopt common policies at the UN. Yet, both under the Harper government and now under Trudeau’s, Canada ignores Africa in all three critical fields: diplomatic, economic and military. If Canada wishes to win one of the two seats competed for as well by Norway and Ireland at the June 2020 vote, it must urgently develop a Strategy of Engagement with the Continent in the three fields heretofore mentioned.

The first component of this engagement strategy should focus on diplomacy, to be developed along two paths – a stronger physical presence on the ground and a sustained relationship with the leaders of the continent. In the last few decades the diplomatic footprint of Canada in Africa has withered away. The number of embassies and diplomatic missions has dropped from 26 to 21 on a continent of 54 countries. Budgets have been reduced and embassies have become microscopic in size. This contrasts with policies adopted by other developed countries. Turkey now has 40 embassies in Africa, South Korea 22 and Norway, a country of 5 million, competing with Canada for a seat on the Council already has 19 missions in Africa and plans to open two more.

Canadian politicians have to go and meet Africans counterparts if they wish Canada’s candidacy to be taken seriously. The Prime Minister and his Ministers must increase significantly their visits to the continent. This is something that does not seem to be understood in Ottawa. In 2016, Justin Trudeau declined an invitation to deliver a speech at the Heads of states’ summit of the African Union in Kigali, Rwanda. Not surprisingly, he was no longer invited in 2017 and 2018. To this day he has not gone any further then Liberia and Madagascar. Several ministers including Foreign Affairs, National Defence and International Development have been more active. But that is not sufficient. Canada is facing competitors that are very active and some have even decided to copycat the French practice of France-Africa Summits. For example China, India, Japan and the United States regularly organize these kinds of summits where the Head of state of the host country takes the time to meet with each African leader separately. Canada cannot be just a bystander. It must be more ambitious and organize similar Summits.
The second component of this engagement strategy is the strengthening of our economic presence. President Donald Trump’s insistence on reviewing the North American Free Trade Agreement from top to bottom has underscored the extent of Canada’s dependency on the United States and its limited margin of maneuver on the international stage. Canada’s economic presence in Africa it is essentially limited to the mining and oil and gas exploration and extractive sectors. Canadian companies are present in 43 of the 54 countries of the continent. This presence is an asset which cannot be neglected. However, according to the 2017 report of the African Development Bank (ADB) on the Continent’s economic perspectives, African growth depends less on natural resources and far more on improving the business environment and macroeconomic governance. Economic diversification and middle-class growth require massive investments in a number of activities such as infrastructure, information and communication technologies, energy, agro food, transportation and hotel management. Quite surprisingly Canada is nearly absent from all these sectors.

The third and last element of this engagement strategy is the Security Dimension. If Canada wishes to benefit from African economic growth and expand its influence on the international stage it should actively engage in the resolution of conflicts on the continent. Africa is the site of the majority of conflicts and crises on the planet today and is host to 8 of the 15 peacekeeping operations of United Nations, 7 of the military and civilian peace missions of the European Union and one mission of the African Union. Finally, Canadians are directly affected by these conflicts. Eight Canadian aid officers and family members have died during the terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso committed by a jihadist group in early 2016.

In May 2018 Ottawa announced the deployment of 6 helicopters within the United Nation mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It is a beginning but it is far from the ambitious plan which had been presented to the Prime Minister in December 2016 which would have made Canada a premier actor for peace in Mali.

Canada is not an unknown quantity in Africa. It has planted long-standing seeds. Its missionaries, its aid offices, its business people, its diplomats and its military have created strong bonds and memories on the Continent going back to the end of the 19th century. Canada has built colleges and universities in Africa. Canadians have dug wells and mines, built roads and monuments, maintained peace and even waged war there. Unfortunately, that presence is slowly disappearing due to a lack of interest on the part of the Ottawa elites. This is a tragic mistake that needs repairing. At stake is our status in the world and our presence on the Security Council.

Jocelyn Coulon is a researcher at the University of Montreal’s Research and Study Center (CERIUM). He was a Senior Political Advisor to the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2016-2017 and he has just published a book Un selfie avec Justin Trudeau. Regard critique sur la diplomatie du premier ministre, at Éditions Québec Amérique (2018).
Monique Cuillerier

Canada ought to build its multilateral leadership potential in areas where the country has already demonstrated the experience and capacity to be taken seriously. The federal government has taken steps in this direction regarding women’s rights and related areas -- promoting women’s empowerment and education; supporting the women, peace and security agenda; developing training for women in peacekeeping; and more. Another area where Canada has experience to share is in the identification, protection, and expansion of LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex) rights. Canada has a strong legislative and rights framework in place, including the legalization of same-sex sexual activity, marriage, and adoption; allowing LGBTI individuals to serve openly in the military; and laws protecting sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. There is, of course, still room for improvements in, for example, police attitudes towards LGBTI communities and the ban on blood donations by men who have sex with men.

And, aside from these positive domestic improvements in LGBTI rights and protections, Canada has already begun to take steps internationally to promote and protect them.

Canada is currently a co-chair, with Chile, of the Equal Rights Coalition (ERC) the first intergovernmental coalition dedicated to the protection of the rights of LGBTI people globally, which is currently comprised of 40 states. The ERC is intended to both advance LGBTI human rights internationally and be a multilateral organization that is flexible, integrated with civil society and responsive to new and evolving situations.

Additionally, the government is engaged in other bilateral and multilateral environments to promote such rights, sharing Canada’s progress in protecting these rights and the resulting positive impact, and working with Canadian and international civil society organizations to promote these rights.

Specifically, Canada encourages the decriminalization of same-sex conduct, supports grassroots LGBTI organizations, and condemns violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In November 2016, at the meeting of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said, “Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities suffer in too many countries, including certain members of la Francophonie who are here today” (https://www.macleans.ca/news/trudeau-pushes-lgbt-rights-at-francophonie-summit/). Canada has raised similar issues within the Commonwealth.

The government is also supportive of the growing inclusion of LGBTI issues broadly in various UN
agencies and programs, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNESCO, and the World Health Organization, as well as in non-UN international organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. So while we see that within the UN system there has been an increased recognition and understanding of the needs and rights of LGBTI communities, there is still a need for a strong voice for these communities at the Security Council to help normalize these rights more broadly.

In an article ahead of the Equal Rights Coalition (ERC) conference in August 2018 in Vancouver, Olena Semenova and Brent Hawkes (https://www.straight.com/news/1112396/olena-semenova-and-brent-hawkes-what-does-world-needs-more-canada-mean-when-it-comes), discussed what it means for Canada to do more when it comes to LGBTI rights. Canada can support LGBTI human rights defenders, both through funding and diplomatic channels, and Canada can also provide funding to LGBTI organizations in Canada and around the world. They concluded by asking, "Why should Canada want to be a global leader in promoting LGBTI rights? Because respecting and protecting LGBTI people promotes inclusion and strengthens our society. Because LGBTI rights are human rights. Because we can't pick and choose which rights we promote."

Following the ERC conference, the government agreed to dedicate new funding for LGBTI civil society organizations in conflict areas, committed to updating their own guidelines for supporting human rights defenders, and pledged to meet soon with civil society organizations to identify domestic and international issues and needs. While these commitments are welcome, Canada is capable of more.

But what is Canada willing to do? If these are our values, if human rights are important to us, we need to stand up for them. How can Canada translate this experience and capacity into leadership within the UN system?

Canada has made progress on, or is in the process of addressing, most of the core issues and challenges facing LGBTI communities. Canada is generally supportive and practically has taken some steps. But Canada could be more vocal and forceful in raising awareness of LGBTI rights violations and encouraging stronger commitments to human rights for all within the UN.
Peacekeeping Promises: Kept or Broken?

Walter Dorn

Upon election in 2015, Justin Trudeau promised that Canada would re-engage in UN peacekeeping, after it has reached historically lowest levels of participation under the government of Stephen Harper. The new Prime Minister gave explicit instructions to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in the minister’s Mandate letter to provide the UN with specialized personnel and capabilities, to help the United Nations respond more quickly, and to lead an international effort in training.

The government then made specific pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in London, UK, in September 2016 for “up to” 750 uniformed personnel (600 military and 150 police). Then, while hosting the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver in November 2017, the Prime Minister elaborated on the London pledge of 600 military, which was to take the form of Tactical Airlift Support, an Aviation Task Force, and a Quick Reaction Force. In Vancouver, Canada’s new pledge was not for additional personnel but the promotion of women’s participation in peacekeeping (the “Elsie initiative”) and a pledge to help with UN training.

Have these sizeable and impressive promises been fulfilled? As the Trudeau government enters the last quarter of its current term of office, has Canada really “re-engaged” in UN peacekeeping?

To answer, we have to look at each type of pledge: personnel, capabilities, women, and training. For the personnel pledge, the number deployed provides one countable way to check on the promises. Until the mission in Mali finally got off the ground in July 2018, the deployment numbers did not increase at all, but actually fall to the lowest number of uniformed personnel since 1956. In May 2018 the figure was a mere 19 military deployed! This is less than half of what the Harper government had provided. With the Mali task force being approximately 250, the total military contribution will be under 300. Thus, Canada is at less than half of the number of military personnel it suggested at the London ministerial.

For police, the figures are even worse. The number deployed has dropped significantly under the Trudeau government. The Conservative government, before it left office, had 89 police deployed. The Liberals have brought that number down to 22 (31 July 2018), mostly due to the end of the Haiti peacekeeping mission. So the police component is far from being at the pledged 150; it is only 15% of that. And, even more startling, this is less than a quarter of the police officers that the Conservative government had deployed. The Trudeau government pledged in Vancouver that...
“new police missions [were] being examined” but no announcement has been made.

Canada sought to be a champion of the participation of women in UN peacekeeping. But Canada has not reached the UN’s target of 15%. As of 31 July 2018, military women were only 8% (12 of 156 military personnel). For police, the picture was better: 32% (7 of only 22 police). But Canada’s support, done through the “Elsie Initiative”, to help other nation’s deployment of women into UN operations has been minimal. Canada has yet to provide any of the promised funds ($15 million) or turn its rhetoric into action.

In his mandate letter to the defence minister, the Prime Minister requested that Canada provide “mission commanders” for UN operations. The Trudeau government has not yet done so. Canada lost the opportunity to provide the Force Commander for the Mali (MINUSMA) mission in January 2017 when it dithered and delayed in offering a force package for the mission. Canada had provided seven mission commanders in the 1990s, but none since.

Canada made its first “smart pledge” in Vancouver: Tactical Airlift Support. A C-130 was to be based in Entebbe, Uganda, to serve multiple missions. But this seemingly innovative plan is in limbo after discussions with the UN in New York showed that this pledge might not be so “smart” after all, with UN needs being elsewhere.

The other pledges in Vancouver were for an Aviation Task Force, the one pledge that Canada has fulfilled. The Task Force in Mali includes an important aeromedical unit, three heavy transport Chinook Helicopters with five Griffon helicopter for escort duty, proving very useful. However, the Quick Reaction Force, also pledged, is nowhere to be seen. If and when it does eventually materialize, it will have been an exceedingly slow deployment of a Quick Reaction Force to a mission.

The Vancouver pledge included “Innovative Training” but Canada has still not significantly improved its own training for peace operations. It carries out less than one quarter of the training activities that it did before the Harper government came to power in 2006. Furthermore, the envisioned “Canadian Training and Advisory Teams” to train foreign military forces have yet to materialize.

So the government’s declaration that its renewal of peacekeeping commitments is “Underway – on track,” is inaccurate at best, or outright false at worst. The Canadian government has yet to match its words with deeds. In 2018, the defence minister exhorted the UN Security Council with good advice: “The time for change is now and we must be bold.” If only the Canadian government could practice what it preaches. All the promises on peacekeeping, except one, remain broken promises. And time is running out to make good on them.

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Ferry de Kerckhove

There were some hesitations about inserting a chapter in this booklet with any Middle-Eastern resonance considering the dearth of Canadian policy towards the region … beyond the “brave” abstention on the UN General Assembly’s resolution to thwart the US decision to move their Embassy to Jerusalem. There was a total lack of reference to the Middle East in Foreign Minister Freeland’s otherwise solid foreign policy speech in Parliament on June 6th, 2017.

In fact, the only Middle Eastern issue of significance which created rifts throughout Canada’s political establishment and beyond was the sale to Saudi Arabia of the armored jeeps built by GDLS in Eastern Ontario for $15 billion. And today, Saudi Arabia is haunting Canada once again in cutting off all relations in response to a ministerial tweet critical of the Kingdom’s human rights. Thereafter we found ourselves very lonely in the world. Clearly our Jerusalem abstention did not get us brownie points from our US neighbours, themselves deeply imbedded in a Saudi embrace. The silence of our EU “partners” was deafening as well.

So the real question in all this is the broader foreign policy impact of the “Canadian tweet-gate” notably for Canada’s UN ambitions. This question in no way reduces my admiration for the principled stand of Canada. Furthermore, the insistence on bemoaning the tweet as THE mistake is somewhat spurious if not hypocritical inasmuch as had the Minister made a similar statement to a journalist, the Saudi reaction would most likely have been the same. It is equally clear that as Canada matters less for Saudi Arabia than other partners benefitting from more juicy contracts with the Kingdom, we became the scapegoat to warn others not to annoy the Royal Prince. That this outburst is a reflection of changing paradigms on the international stage cannot be dismissed either. And that is what Canada needs to worry about both in terms of its eventual defence of the broad multilateralist liberal order and with respect to its UN Security Council campaign. Both are interrelated.

On the former, it is clear that the international liberal order is under attack, plagued by Trump’s waning US engagement, a weak and divided West, poor leadership, illiberalism, electoral gamesmanship, and growing inequalities feeding a general mistrust in government. Meanwhile, hostility towards Western democracy and its human rights mantra is fed by both the catastrophic impact of the 2008 financial crisis which destroyed the non-western world’s confidence in the western economic model, and the appeal of the autocratic, state-run, Chinese economic and political mode. So, a major shift that can be expressed as “dewesternization” is happening exactly at a time when we ask and expect the Trudeau government to assume a certain leadership to rekindle the faith in multilateralism, the UN, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and in the UN. So the news is not very good: Saudi Arabia’s reaction, the muteness of our allies, our own weakness in articulating what should be a resounding call for an alliance of like-minded countries in defence of the international liberal order, the unholy alliance between China and Russia in
subverting that order, all point to a very unappealing outcome. Just from the perspective of our UN Security Council campaign, what we, Canada, represents is anathema to a growing number of countries we could count on in the past. Saudi Arabia will make sure that as many members of the Arab League as possible will vote for Ireland and Norway. China, possibly miffed by the Trudeau team adding environmentalism, labor relations, feminism and human rights into a Canada-China bilateral trade negotiations, could likely use its leverage to bring its Asian partners in line. Even Japan’s irksomeness towards our Prime Minister’s initial AWOL on the Trans-Pacific Partnership might remain. Hopefully the Australians as loyal CANZ partners will have forgiven. India may not consider Commonwealth loyalty significant.

So what? Not only must the Trudeau government light the afterburner for its Security Council campaign with a maximum personal involvement by the PM and his ministers, in addition to a cohort of special envoys with UN experience. Canada must come with a compelling agenda. The latter should include walking the talk through concrete engagements – Mali should be a beginning, not the end of our commitment to peacekeeping, and we should also voice leadership in areas of conflict prevention, stabilization, peacebuilding and development (0.29 % of GDP will not do!), becoming a thought leader on climate change. Canada must develop a more cohesive approach and process on human rights.

But more importantly, over the next 12 months, Canada needs to build a coalition of countries for the defence of democracy. Too many countries have left the bandwagon. Yet their people want their governments to rejoin.

The ultimate result of the Saudi episode may be that Canada may find a truer path to world leadership. It is not just a question of manoeuvring in global institutions – although this too is necessary. True leadership means continuous principled support of key international norms such as human rights and democracy. We must try to mobilize the support of like-minded countries for this democratic-human rights agenda but even if we have to start off alone, we must ride high in the saddle. We need a plan to make human rights both universal and universally applicable.

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Organizing to put Canada back in the International game

Daniel Livermore

In pursuing international goals, most governments devote attention and resources towards getting their policy objectives straight and ensuring proper communications to both domestic and foreign audiences. There is another requirement that is also an essential underpinning of international success, albeit little appreciated, including in Canada. It’s having a nimble, capable, adaptable and experienced foreign ministry, able to use the levers of national power effectively and deploy diplomatic instruments to a country’s best advantage.

If Canada wants to return to a position of international leadership, the Canadian government has to commit itself to re-building Global Affairs Canada (hereinafter GAC). It was once a capable foreign ministry, not only in human resources, but also in the types of attitudes and programs needed to advance national interests. It has atrophied over the past decade and more in an especially fallow period of Canadian foreign policy performance, and there are no recent signs of its rejuvenation.

GAC’s re-building needs three things, none of which are difficult or require additional resources. But energy and thought have to be put into this exercise, which cannot be left to the vagaries of a weakened public service in Ottawa. The first requirement is an overhaul of GAC’s approach to human resources. The entire cycle of foreign service recruitment, promotion and assignment needs to be placed on sounder foundations. Start with the regular recruitment and training of high-calibre junior officers, with an emphasis on foreign experience and languages. Give officers regular assignments in Ottawa and to a wide variety of missions around the world to build depth of knowledge based on first-hand experience. Put an emphasis on crisis locations where officers acquire language skills, expertise, judgment and capacity to lead. Then assign promising officers jobs in Ottawa and important posts abroad with increasing responsibilities, including secondments to the Privy Council Office and other government departments to build experience in how government works and how issues are managed. None of this is a mystery. What’s mysterious is how a department that for decades led the way in Ottawa on issues of recruitment, promotion and assignments has so badly mangled both its foreign service and also its cadre of non foreign-service officers.

Weave into this new human resource model a fundamental requirement of every successful foreign service: a reasonable level of over-recruitment and excess capacity at all levels. GAC needs considerable personnel capacity beyond positions within GAC itself, so that it can second or loan officers on a regular basis to other departments of the Canadian government,
to the provinces, to international organizations and to the private sector, including universities and non-governmental organizations. These secondments are critical to bringing into GAC new perspectives, experiences and management techniques, as well as sharing GAC views and experiences with others. When contributing to peace operations, for example, this capability is essential for seconding officers to the Canadian military and the United Nations and its agencies, providing essential civilian capacity to make peace operations effective.

A second requirement is attitudinal. GAC has become a department obsessed with process and procedures at the cost of recognizing fundamental objectives. It is not goal-oriented and has lost sight of simplicity and ease of operations, as well as the need to foster partnerships with others, particularly in the development field. It has become slow and excessively hierarchical at precisely the time when its hierarchy lacks foreign policy experience. It needs dramatic attitudinal change, renewing its dexterity and declaring war on excessive procedures that make it cumbersome and unable to respond to new challenges. A drastic cut to GAC’s excessive senior management complement would free up resources for useful purposes.

The third requirement is restoring to GAC some of the basic tools of diplomacy, slashed during the Harper years. Like every major foreign ministry, GAC needs an effective public affairs capability, as well as a way to promote Canadian culture and academic relations abroad. The best way to bring these tools to GAC are through partnerships with others, like national cultural organizations, NGOs, universities, businesses and churches, thereby avoiding the current GAC tendency to try to do everything itself. Before launching new initiatives in this area, GAC needs to consult widely about the most effective ways of advancing this critical pillar of an effective foreign policy.

GAC is now at an important cross-road. Given its currently dire situation, with dozens of staff vacancies in key positions, depletion of linguistic expertise, an unduly large, complicated (and largely inexperienced) senior management structure, and growing frustration among staff over lack of promotions and good assignments, it faces enormous challenges to which no adequate response seems in sight. If Canada wants to return to the international stage, however, it has to get the foundations right. If we want a position of influence in a difficult world, we have to build our capacity to exert influence. One of those foundational pieces is GAC. The government should be challenged into getting this right.

Daniel Livermore was a foreign service officer for more than three decades. He was Ambassador to Guatemala and El Salvador from 1996 to 1999 and was subsequently Ambassador for the international campaign to ban landmines from 1999 to 2002. From 2002 to 2006, he was director general for Security and Intelligence in Foreign Affairs Canada. His 2018 book, “Detained: Islamic Fundamentalist Extremism and the War on Terror in Canada”, published by McGill-Queen's University Press, examines how the War on Terror went wrong for Canada and Canadians after 9/11.
From leader to laggard: the shocking demise of Canadian disarmament diplomacy

Peggy Mason

In “A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament: 1945-1988”, authors Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann conclude that Canada’s substantial influence on arms control and disarmament rested quite simply on “competence” and “expertise” and the value of good ideas. In the post-cold war world of East-West confrontation and the heyday of “political realism”, Canada’s investment in building international consensus on concrete measures to reduce tensions and eliminate destabilising weaponry was a surprisingly successful effort, carried out by both Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments of the day right through the 20th century.

Contrast this proud legacy with Canada’s disgraceful treatment of the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). To our everlasting shame we joined with other NATO members in an ignoble statement, timed to coincide with the opening for signature of the landmark Treaty, alleging that a treaty approved by more than 120 UN member states was “ineffective” and “at odds” with the existing nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The argument that NATO’s nuclear policy could somehow trump the legally binding obligation in Article V of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, NPT – to negotiate in good faith towards the goal of nuclear disarmament – is sadly something we expect from the nuclear weapons states, but not from a former stalwart champion of real progress toward nuclear disarmament - as Canada once was.

The only good news on this front is that Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland apparently heard the resulting outcry from Canadian civil society and altered the government’s official tone from one of derision for the Treaty to an acknowledgement of its origins in the legitimate frustration and disappointment of the international community over the snail’s pace of disarmament efforts.

The Canadian retreat from leadership in disarmament diplomacy is not limited to the nuclear front. In many areas of conventional weaponry control, Canada is setting a bad example. Take the case of armed drones, where stronger and clearer international rules of the road are sorely needed, to regulate their use in the seemingly never-ending “war on terror” and especially to limit their potential for harming innocent civilians. As part of its new Defence Policy, announced in June 2017, Canada committed to their acquisition for “precision targeting”, without any rationale for why Canada needed armed drones nor even any policy governing their use, although the Prime Minister provided oral assurances that there would be a policy in place “before” any actual use.

At least in the area of the peaceful uses of outer space – a long standing Canadian policy and a treaty obligation – the new Defence Policy asserts that “Canada can demonstrate leadership by promoting the military and civilian norms of responsible behaviour in space required to ensure the peaceful use of outer space”.

In the vital area of cyberspace, however, the picture is a decidedly different one. Without any further substantiation, the new policy boldly asserts that a “purely defensive cyber posture is no longer sufficient” and commits Canada to also engage in “offensive cyber operations” in support of military missions. The offensive activity could, in fact, go far beyond the military domain since Canada’s intelligence agencies have also been authorized to engage in offensive cyber operations.
The now familiar assurance - that Canada will act in conformity with domestic and international norms - once again brings cold comfort, given the alarming lacuna in current international law and norms governing so-called cyber warfare.

Cluster munitions provide another bad Canadian example. Although we have banned these weapons in accordance with the international treaty thereon, our domestic implementation legislation includes a loophole that allows Canadian Forces personnel to assist Allies currently outside the Treaty in the use of these banned weapons. Canada needs to repair its flawed cluster munitions implementation legislation to categorically prohibit any form of aid or assistance in the use of these banned weapons and to make explicit the positive obligations on states to suppress their use. Canadian implementing legislation should also prohibit investment in enterprises associated with the development, production and/or use of these weapons. Now that would be leadership in disarmament diplomacy!

Civil Society has lauded our government’s intention to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty, and expressed gratification at recent amendments to the accession legislation to include a new binding obligation on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to reject arms exports to countries where there is evidence of “substantial risk” of their use in human rights abuses. At the same time, there has been widespread condemnation of the exclusion of arms exports to the USA from the assessment process, in clear violation of Article 2 of the treaty. Canada is also failing to provide any leadership in the growing international effort to ban lethal autonomous weapons, aka “killer robots”.

Global Affairs talking points reference the welcome resumption of annual arms control consultations with civil society and hail Canada’s ongoing work to build support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and our participation in the American-led effort to elaborate verification measures in the event that the nuclear weapons states ever commit to negotiating nuclear disarmament. But these efforts pale in comparison with the vast nuclear weapons modernization programs currently underway. In effect, our once productive “step by step” approach has now turned into a futile effort to inch forward toward the ever-receding nuclear disarmament horizon while standing on a conveyor belt hurtling backwards towards a world filled with ever more lethal nuclear weapons.

To get back into the game, Global Affairs Canada should immediately:

Engage NATO members in resisting deployment of modernized “tactical” nuclear weapons in Europe in preparation for eventual accession to the TPNW;

Pursue a total ban on killer robots and a tight international regulatory regime for the restricted deployment and use of armed drones;

Refrain from offensive cyber operations in favour of redoubled efforts to strengthen international law and norms for cyberspace; and

Bring our domestic legislation on cluster munitions and the arms trade fully into conformity with the applicable international treaties.

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Laura Schnurr

Canada’s spat with Saudi Arabia over tweets by Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland calling for the release of detained Saudi women’s rights activists is illustrative of a greater challenge we face in our efforts to be a human rights leader globally: our intentions may be noble, but we simply aren’t getting the desired results.

Since taking office in November 2015, the Liberals have done much in the way of high-minded declarations and grand promises around human rights, gender equality, climate change and Indigenous reconciliation. Critics are quick to trivialize these statements. But such virtue-signalling to the international community does matter – especially now, as we witness a lack of leadership from states that have traditionally played this role at the global level.

Still, symbolic gestures, in and of themselves, are not enough, and unlikely to lead to tangible results in terms of human rights protection.

What if Canada were to devote energy and resources towards strengthening international capacity to deal with both current and future human rights violations around the world? Working in support of international norms could enable us to help pave the way for more robust human rights protection globally, without exposing ourselves to potential backlash – which, as we have seen with Saudi Arabia’s retaliation, can be costly.

Various ideas have been put forth over the years by scholars, practitioners and experts aimed at bolstering the institutional architecture around human rights. Some explore the potential for a new institution, as is the case with the proposal for a World Court of Human Rights which would fill a gap in the judicial system by covering many violations of international human rights law raised by individuals (rather than states) that are outside the jurisdiction of existing forums. Others focus on improving existing United Nations human rights machinery, in particular the Human Rights Council.

The UN Human Rights Council is a notoriously challenged institution. Its political nature is largely to blame for its failures to protect human rights. Selectivity, bias and national interests consistently triumph over principled action. This need not be the case. Proposals have been developed to make the body more fair, impartial and effective. For example, changing the representation to ensure that human rights
experts are present; putting prevention at the forefront of the Council’s agenda; formalizing its relationship to non-governmental organizations; and potentially changing the Council’s status to become a principle UN organ. The need for reforms is widely acknowledged, and several countries appear prepared to form a multi-stakeholder coalition to turn existing ideas into reality. This is Canada’s opportunity to show leadership.

Canada can’t fix the world’s human rights abuses on its own – neither through tweets nor through diplomatic pressure, which it has been applying with limited success. But it can help strengthen global institutions so we are collectively better equipped to deal with violations. That would be a legacy consistent with Canada’s past human rights legacies, such as our role in helping draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, our key contribution to creating the International Criminal Court, and our leadership in establishing the Responsibility to Protect principle.

Finally, being a human rights leader globally also means being a human rights leader locally. Canada still has much work to do in this respect, particularly when it comes to protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada. The government has committed to protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada but has failed to do so in many cases, most notably around rights to land and resources. Canada finally adopted the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2016 (removing the objector status it had for the prior decade), and now must ensure these commitments are respected. Meanwhile, in 2015, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission outlined 76 calls to action that fall under federal jurisdiction. Despite promising to implement all of these, the government said earlier this year that only a handful had been fully met, with the vast majority (51 calls) stuck in the early stages of planning and implementation.

Canada needs to revisit its approach to human rights and complement its vocal and visible declarations with some concrete actions – both within and beyond our borders.

Laura Schnurr is the co-author of A United Nations Renaissance: What the UN is, and what it could be (Barbara Budrich 2018). She completed an MA in Global Studies at the University of Freiburg, has firsthand experience in the UN system and runs a social enterprise in Canada and Uganda. Laura is currently an Advisor with the McConnell Foundation in Montreal and previously worked on social policy with the federal government.
Ideas for United Nations renewal

John Trent

People complain that the United Nations is irrelevant because the Security Council often vetoes decisions on desperate world problems – like Syria. We need ideas about making the UN a “built for purpose” organization that can make and implement decisions on difficult global issues.

We can build on the work of International specialists who have analyzed reforms for decades. This is not a specific plan for UN reform but rather a highlighting of some of the more necessary and workable transformations.

All member nations should pay their fair portion of fees. Prof. Joseph Schwartzberg in his book, Transforming the United Nations System, proposes that the best route is to abandon the present complex system of fees and voluntary contributions and replace them with a small, affordable and equal national assessment based on a percentage (say 0.1 percent) of the respective gross national income (GNI). When calculated in 2010 this would have raised twice the spending of the entire UN system at that time. Additionally, there are a myriad of proposals for independent financial resources for the UN including levies on air and sea travel, on production from the global commons, and on transnational movements of currencies. The problem with enacting these ideas is the unwillingness of many governments to endorse improved sources of finance because they do not want the UN to have too much independence. That is why it is necessary to focus on funding as the first objective of a new mobilization of public opinion in favor of a UN renaissance.

The effective functioning of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle is crucial. It has been the most significant step for controlling the abuses of sovereignty. The “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” proposed six principles that must be respected before the UN decides on military intervention to protect against human suffering. They are: a “just cause threshold”, “right intention”, “last resort”, “proportional means”, “reasonable prospects”, and “right authority”. The Commission also proposed “operational principles” including clear objectives, unity of command, force limitations, international law, and coordination with humanitarian organizations. Disastrously, all of these propositions have been ignored. It is time they were resuscitated.

Experts conclude that the UN Security Council can regain legitimacy and effectiveness by becoming more representative of the world and placing limitations on the outdated power of veto (e.g. using “dissenting votes” that do not amount to a veto). Membership should be expanded (around 22 is most often proposed) to reflect the increase in UN membership. The Council should improve resources and political support for peace missions and constitutie a ‘Group of Friends’ for each operation (Commission of Global Security, Justice and Governance).

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Decision-making in the UN can be re-aligned to reflect the real power of member states. For instance, the General Assembly has steadily been skewed to favor relatively minor states. Some 40 members have less than a million inhabitants and 128 states collectively pay less than 1.3 per cent of the total UN budget (2010 figures). All the organs need weighted voting to take into account differences in power, population and economic contributions. The democratic principle would make population the determining factor. Economic capacity would be represented by contributions to the UN budget. To heed the sovereign equality principle each state would maintain its single vote. Joseph Schwartzberg (2013) carefully combined the mathematical calculations of each of these components in one simple formula as a weighted vote which could be adjusted over time.

In the case of the Security Council, to break the log jam, it is proposed that the weighted vote be based on representing 12 world regions in the Council rather than individual states. Each region would nominate a slate of candidates from which one would be elected to the Security Council by the General Assembly. Subsequent reelections would depend on good behavior.

Finally as regards the organs, the rich and powerful must be enticed back from the G20 to the UN by a new Economic, Social and Environmental Council with adequate structures and powers to oversee these three world functions. The UN’s founders intended the original ECOSOC to coordinate the economic and social work of the UN system and also coordinate all its specialized agencies and other bodies.

The UN requires its own autonomous emergency services so it can save money and lives in the gigantic peace missions by intervening in a timely fashion to stop conflicts from spreading. The United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) proposal would furnish the Secretary General with a standing, professional, volunteer, highly trained peace service of 15,000 soldiers, police and civil servants who could go immediately to hot spots before they explode (Peter Langille 2015).

Of course, there are many more transformations required for a full-fledged renaissance of the UN.

It will be necessary to mobilize political will. Already, the UN 2020 Initiative, formed of Civil Society and UN representatives, is working to make the 75th anniversary of the United Nations in 2020 an opportunity not only for commemoration but also for stocktaking, renewal and reform. It is calling for a General Assembly led preparatory process and resolution leading to intergovernmental negotiations and a Leaders Summit in 2020.
Mobilizing for UN reform

Fergus Watt

It has become commonplace in international politics these days to bemoan the impacts of rising nationalism and autocracy, particularly among some of the world’s largest and most powerful states. Internationalism, the rule of law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter have (to say the least) seen better days.

Some governments that have led at the United Nations are no longer doing so. Its most powerful Member State and largest donor, the United States, has withdrawn funding from UN budgets, (including the peacekeeping budget, the UN Fund for Population Activities and the UN Relief and Works Agency), withdrawn from important UN bodies (notably UNESCO and the Human Rights Council), as well as multilateral processes (on climate change and migration, among others). The Security Council too often remains paralyzed with both Russia and the United States casting vetoes to protect their client states. Moreover, Russia and some of its allies run roughshod over major international legal prohibitions on intervention (Crimea) and use of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. And the current political climate allows China to expand its influence abroad and to restrict even further civic space, including freedoms of association and expression.

And when major powers that have important responsibilities under the Charter shirk their obligations others are tempted to follow suit.

However, there is a resilience to the multilateral system, fortified by a recognition that, in the 21st century, the machinery of international cooperation is needed more than ever.

At a time when large powers are doubling-down on militarism, nuclear weapons and trade protectionism, there are significant numbers of small and medium states that need the kind of rules-based order that depends on a flourishing and proper-functioning UN system. Some promising developments include:

- The determination of Secretary-General Guterres who is doggedly pursuing useful reforms to the UN Management structures, improvements in the coherence of the UN Development System and a reorganization of the UN Secretariat’s peacebuilding architecture.

- Outgoing General Assembly President Miroslav Lajčák of Slovakia responded to the current crisis in multilateralism by convening an unprecedented series of off-the-record breakfast meetings for UN ambassadors. Mr. Lajčák’s successor, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, will also be someone to watch. Her acceptance speech as incoming General Assembly President last June identified UN strengthening and reform among her promised priorities.

- And importantly, a significant number of governments have called for utilizing the upcoming 75th anniversary of the United Nations in 2020 as an opportunity to further strengthen the Organization. This latter development responds to some quiet but persistent campaigning by civil society organizations over the past 18 months, calling for an adequately prepared 75th anniversary commemoration for the United Nations in 2020, one that includes a meaningful process of stocktaking, review and strengthening for the organization.

Canada is supporting this UN2020 process. In remarks at the
General Assembly Canada recognized that, “Civil society has become an essential partner in advancing the goals of the UN,” and that governments will need to encourage “multistakeholder inputs and thinking creatively about what we hear.”

Canada also cited the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals as an example of what multistakeholder diplomacy through the General Assembly can achieve, while noting the essential role civil society will play in the achievement of Agenda 2030.

UN2020 campaigners had hoped that language mandating a formal process for a 2020 Summit could be agreed in a General Assembly resolution this September. However, opposition from the Non-Aligned Movement (notably Cuba, Egypt and Algeria) prevented the Assembly from reaching consensus.

Nevertheless, the idea of a 2020 Summit has considerable traction at the UN, with expressed support among a cross-regional group of states including Brazil, Canada (on behalf of CANZ), Estonia on behalf of the ACT (Accountability, Coherence, Transparency) group of states, Nigeria, Norway, Uruguay and the European Union in a statement that included 8 or 9 East European states, and EU candidate countries Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, as well as potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

Civil society organizations have recognized the opportunity inherent in a 2020 Summit and begun to organize. At the August 2018 67th UN Department of Public Information NGO (UN DPI/NGO) Conference, upwards of 1500 NGOs called upon Member States to, “Advance people-centered multilateralism by developing proposals to revitalize the United Nations on the occasion of its 75th Anniversary in 2020.”

In the face of very real threats to international diplomacy, governments at the UN cannot simply do nothing and “weather the storm.” The idea of a 2020 anniversary summit offers a political space where those committed to multilateralism can push back, through a mandated stocktaking, re-commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter, and reforms that strengthen the organization.

Canada can and should help. (1) Support for a 2020 process should be part of the Prime Minister’s remarks at the opening of the 2018 General Assembly. (2) Then, beyond generalities, Canada needs a game plan, a Canadian vision of what a 21st century United Nations should look like. Officials at Global Affairs Canada’s UN Affairs Division, preoccupied as always with the day-to-day of UN meetings, resolutions and events, should undertake a consultative process such as the stakeholder dialogues that helped develop the renewed Canadian National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security.
Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy: Will It Travel to New York?

Beth Woroniuk

“As a proud feminist, I am honoured to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs in a government with an unabashedly feminist foreign policy that integrates gender equality into our diplomacy, trade, security and development efforts.”

Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Women’s Day (March 8), 2018

Canada has taken steps towards a feminist foreign policy. In June 2017 the government launched its Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP). A new, improved and updated National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (CNAP) was released in November of that year. Reversing the stand of the previous government, Trudeau’s Liberals have been staunch defenders of sexual and reproductive rights around the world. Canada’s ‘progressive trade agenda’ has included efforts to incorporate gender equality considerations into trade agreements. The Government has spoken out on LGBTQ rights.

While these are undeniably important steps, there has not been cheering from all sides. Feminist critics have pointed out a lack of policy coherence, asking if arms sales to Saudi Arabia are consistent with a feminist agenda. They have also stressed the lack of resources available to implement these ambitious policies. There are questions on whether or not actions have actually lived up to the policy ambitions. Others, coming from a different perspective, have argued that championing these views and values will get in the way of achieving other Canadian foreign policy goals.

Unlike Sweden, Canada has no over-arching document outlining its feminist foreign policy or what it means in practice. Canada’s policy is evoked at some times (like International Women’s Day, as seen in the opening quote) and is notably absent at others. For example, Minister Freeland’s June 13, 2018 speech on receiving Foreign Policy’s diplomat of the year award highlighted the importance of rules-based international order and preserving liberal democracies but was silent on feminism and women’s rights.

Recent experience has shown that standing up for women’s rights is not always easy. The 2018 summertime blow up around Minister Freeland’s tweet on Saudi Arabia demonstrated that there can be costs to speaking out on women human rights defenders. It can also be lonely.

Turning to the Security Council, what would a feminist foreign policy mean for Canada at the United Nations?
First, it requires a clear and consistent policy agenda that truly “prioritizes gender equality and the rights of women and girls at its core,” as stated in the CNAP. It requires diplomats across UN forums to understand gender dimensions of their files and speak out on these issues. A feminist approach does more than ‘integrate women’ into current processes. It involves challenging patriarchal structures (as Minister Freeland noted in March 2018 at a side event during the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women). It also requires Canada to address inconsistencies in policy approaches to disarmament, militarization, and investments related to extractive industries.

Second, these feminist foreign policy priorities must be backed by key investments. A priority without money behind it is not a priority. Currently, Canadian efforts to lead on key issues are hampered by international assistance investments far below the 0.7% global target.

Canada would be well advised to promote key flagship issues at the UN. The Elsie Initiative is one example. Announced at the 2017 Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, the Elsie Initiative aims to increase the number of women deployed in UN peacekeeping missions.

Yet one - or even two - initiatives do not a feminist foreign policy make. Canada could do more to support women’s rights organizations (a key stated priority in both the CNAP and the FIAP).

Third, these global priorities need to be backed by consistent domestic performance. Canada cannot urge other countries to increase the number of women serving in peace support operations if we do not increase our own numbers. We cannot urge others to adopt a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse by security forces and peacekeepers, if we are not successful in tackling sexist, racist and homophobic behaviour in the RCMP and Canadian Armed Forces.

There are some who may argue that a full-on feminist foreign policy will hinder Canadian ambitions to win a Security Council seat. They may point out that outspoken advocacy for the rights of women and girls is not the way to win friends in the halls of the United Nations.

Yet it is important to remember that Sweden was successful in their Security Council bid – with their feminist foreign policy.

Beth Woroniuk is the coordinator and co-founder of the Women, Peace and Security Network-Canada. She has been involved in Canadian women, peace and security coalitions since 2000. Beth is currently on the Steering Committee of NATO’s Civil Society Advisory Panel on WPS. With over 25 years of experience on women’s rights and gender equality issues as both an analyst and activist, Beth has worked with bilateral aid agencies, UN entities, development banks and NGOs. Beth is also Policy Lead at The MATCH International Women’s Fund.
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